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Acronyms
• Application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
• Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)
• Electronic Design Automation (EDA)
• Framework for Assessing Security and Trust in MicroElectronics
(FASTIME)
• Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• Information Technology (IT)
• NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP)
• Physical unclonable function (PUF)
• Verification and Validation (V&V)
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Synopsis of Framework
• NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) is 
developing a systematic framework for practicing 
security and trust in ASIC and FPGA applications.
• Goal: User is provided guidance in mitigation best 
practices; correspondingly, missions are expected to 
follow guidelines to the best of their abilities; and a risk 
assessment is performed on the implementation.
3
Framework for Assessing Security and Trust In 
MicroElectronics
(FASTIME)
ASIC: Application specific integrated circuit FPGA: Field programmable gate array
The methodology incorporates work/research performed by a variety of groups: NASA, The 
Aerospace Corporation, RAMBUS, Global Foundries, Mentor Graphics, Synopsys, Xilinx, Graf 
Research, Sandia National Laboratories, and Microsemi.
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FASTIME
Guideline 
Documents
Review
Process
Threat 
Matrix
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RISK ASSESSMENT
Product 
Requirements
GOAL
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FASTIME Strengths
• Two perspectives are used:
– Guidelines and requirements are provided to the target team and are used as 
references for the review process (what should be done).
– Actual implementation is reviewed.
• Framework takes into account:
– Observed gaps.
– Potential gaps (unobtainable information, lack in V&V coverage, not vetted 
personnel).
– Multiple layers of mitigation (co-dependencies).
– Potential for adversary’s learning process as it pertains to the actual 
implementation of mitigation.
– Full ecosystem (personnel, IT, tools, design process, data handling, etc,…)
• Risk analysis is robust:
– Includes V&V coverage but does not end there… coverage is not the only 
element that defines risk.
– Risk metrics are more than colors or simple strength descriptions.
– Risk metrics are based on time-to-infiltration and weighted outcome.
– Risk items can be red-lined for immediate attention.
• Eventual integration with model based system engineering tools.
Vulnerabilities are determined by coverage of guidance, requirements, and 
implementation discrepancies.
5
V&V: Verification and Validation
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FASTIME: Review Process
• Creates visibility and traceability for 
each step of the design process and 
potential contribution to threat.
• Requires an external assessment 
team.
• For the manufacturer’s design 
process evaluation, it is unlikely that 
the trust and security assessment 
team will have access to all files to 
perform V&V.
• Hence, detailed checks of the 
manufacturer’s V&V coverage and 
mitigation processes are expected 
to be performed by the assessment 
team.
• Employs established “checklist” 
approach. 
• Enables risk analysis because of 
detailed information gathering.
Does not restrict EDA tools.  
However assesses coverage.
Guideline 
Documents
Review 
Process
Threat Matrix
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V&V: Verification and Validation
EDA: Electronic design automation
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FASTIME Review Process: Use of An 
Assurance Checklist
• Derived from NASA design review checklist and information 
gathered from partnering organizations.
• Assessments are divided into subcategories with associated risks.
• Links to previously assessed items are included (do not want to 
spend time on vetted items if its listed risk-level is acceptable).
• New column is added to link to Guidelines and Requirements.
1 Information
Security(example section)
Comments Guidelines/Req
uirements Link
Risk 
Metric
1.1
Is the design house DMEA Trust 
certified?
links to DMEA accreditation TAGn0
1.2
If the design house is not under DMEA trust, explain IT security links to IT security documents TAGn1
1.3
List personnel that have access to the design database; and extent of their accessibility/visibility (restrictions) Links to personnel documentation plus highlighted comments TAGn2
Traceability!!!!
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Example: FPGA Security Features Subsection
3 FPGA Security Features Comments Guidelines/Re
quirements
Link
Risk 
Metric
3.1 Does FPGA require a Key? A key is required. Requirement ##.##
3.2
If a Key is required, what type of Key 
is being implemented (e.g.: embedded 
PUF, soft PUF , stored Key, 
components (memory versus ring 
oscillator); 
links to datasheet:
Embedded PUF –
ring oscillator.
3.3
Provide link to Key implementation 
radiation results (Single event effects, 
total dose, and prompt dose); 
No radiation data is 
available 
3.4
Assess functional coverage of 
implementation. Is there potential for 
lockout due to Key access failure ? 
Example of failure can be due to 
radiation effects, adversary learning, 
or gaps in mitigation.
No tests have been 
performed to 
determine lockout 
threat
3.5 If no lockout, show proof.
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PUF: Physical unclonable function
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Road Ahead
• A great deal of work has been 
completed.  However, there is still 
more to be done.
• Further development is required of 
guidelines, review checklist, and 
threat matrix.
– Will require research into 
manufacturer design flow.
– Will require research into 
fabrication house flows.
• EDA tool evaluation.
• Links into model based system 
engineering tools.
• Risk metrics.
Guideline 
Documents
Review 
Process
Threat 
Matrix
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RISK ASSESSMENT
EDA: Electronic design automation
